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EDUCATION IN THE FEDERAL-STATE
STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
NEWTON EDWARDS*
The most important contribution of the United States to political
theory and practice has been its development and implementation
of the concept of "federalism." By its very nature sovereignty is
indivisible, to divide it would be to destroy it. A state cannot be part
sovereign and part not sovereign. But the powers of government
can be divided and some be bestowed on one level of government
and some upon another This is the essence of federalism. It had
its origin in the practices of the old British Empire before 1760.
Before that date both Crown and Parliament concerned themselves,
in the main, with matters of imperial concern; the colonies had
been permitted large measure of freedom in regulating their own
purely local affairs. But when British statesmen abandoned the
practices of the Old Empire and asserted the sovereignty of Parlia-
ment over the colonies in matters of local as well as imperial con-
cern, the colonists revolted and the American Revolution was fought
in large measure to preserve the principles of federalism. After
the Revolution was won, a constitution was finally adopted which
preserved the concept of federalism by bestowing certain powers on
the central government and by reserving to the states all powers
not conferred. Education has, and always has had, an important
place in this federal-state structure of government.
THE IMPLIED POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
TO SUPPORT AND CONTROL EDUCATION
Our federal government is one of delegated rather than inherent
powers. Not only are its powers delegated they are expressly enum-
erated. As the Supreme Court of the United States has put it:
"The federal union is a government of delegated powers. It has
* Professor Emeritus, University of Chicago A. B. University of South Carolina
1910 A. M. 1913, Ed.D. 1943, Columbia University; Ph.D. University of Chicago 1923.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
only such as are expressly conferred upon it and such as are
reasonably to be implied from those granted."' It follows that the
Congress at all times is under the necessity of finding in some
clause or combination of clauses of the Constitution express or
implied authority for all of its legislation.
The Constitution of the United States makes no mention of edu-
cation. Such positive powers over education as the federal govern-
ment has are, therefore, implied powers. The only clause in the
Constitution from which positive powers with respect to education
can be implied is the general welfare clause. This clause confers
upon the Congress the power "to lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States."' 2 Just what
powers this clause conferred upon the federal government was long
a matter of debate. James Madison maintained that the phrase had
been borrowed from the Articles of Confederation, that it had been
adopted by the constitutional convention without debate, that it had
not been regarded by the framers of the Constitution as a phrase
that would extend the area of federal authority, that it referred
merely to later enumerated powers, that it conferred no substantive
powers upon the Congress.8 Alexander Hamilton maintained, on
the other hand, that the general welfare clause conferred upon
Congress the power to tax and spend for purposes separate from
those later enumerated, that it conferred upon Congress a substantive
power to tax and spend for any purpose that would promote the
general welfare.
4
It was not until 1936 that the Supreme Court was called upon
to decide between the Madisonian and the Hamiltonian interpre-
tations of the general welfare clause. The Court adopted the Hamil-
tonian interpretation through dicta saying that the power of Congress
to spend public moneys for public purposes "is not limited by the
direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution." 5
Somewhat later the Supreme Court in Halvering v DavisO brought
to a close the long debate over the power of Congress to tax and
spend under the general welfare clause. The Court upheld the
Social Security Act and for the first time upheld the use of the
proceeds of taxation as an exercise of authority under the general
welfare clause.
While no case involving the power of Congress to tax and spend
for the support of education appears to be on record, the reasoning
of the court in the cases we have cited and in others make it clear
1. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63 (1936).
2. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
2 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 167.
4. 3 HAMILTON'S WORKS 250.
5. UnIted States v. Butler, supra note 1, at 66.
6. 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
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that the Supreme Court would sustain the authority of Congress to
make any reasonable appropriation for the support of education.
7
The constitutional authority of Congress to exercise control
over education is a matter not so easily determined. It seems certain,
however, that the national government may enforce whatever con-
trol measures that are incidental but essential in the accomplish-
ment of the purposes for which federal funds are appropriated and
spent; it may enter into voluntary agreements with the states for
the mutual support of education; it may not spend funds for the
primary purpose of regulating the educational policies of the states.
FEDERAL POWERS GROWING OUT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS ON THE POWERS OF THE STATES
Through the general welfarre clause the Constitution confers cer-
tain powers with respect to education on the national government;
the Constitution also places certain restrictions on the power of the
states and these restrictions when enforced by the Supreme Court
may profoundly affect the policies the states may adopt with respect
to education.
Expenditure of Public Funds For Sectarian Schools and
Religious Exercises
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At first this prohibition
was directed to the Congress and not the states. Before 1940,
anyone who felt he was being deprived of religious freedom by a
state statute carried his case to his own state supreme court. But
in 1940 the Supreme Court of the United States held for the first
time that the Fourteenth Amendment made the First Amendment
applicable to the states as well as to Congress."
This decision represented, in practice, a fundamental change in
the law; now the terrain of the controversy with respect to the re-
lation of state and church to education shifted significantly from
state courts to the Supreme Court of the United States.
In 1947, the Court was called upon to decide whether a statute
of New Jersey permitting local school boards to reimburse the cost
of bus transportation to parents of children attending parochial
schools was m violation of the First Amendment.9 In the opinion
of the Court, the First Amendment means the separation of church
and state; it requires on the part of the state neutrality among all
7. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) United States v. Butler,
supra note 1.
8. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
9. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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religions and between religious believers and non-believers; and it
prevents the levying of any tax, large or small, for the support
of any religious activities or institutions. The First Amendment es-
tablishes a "wall of separation" between church and state which
must be kept "high and impregnable." In the words of the court:
The 'establishment of religion clause' of The First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or remain away from church against his will
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establish-
ment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of
separation between Church and State' The First Amend-
ment has erected a wall of separation between church and
state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We
could not approve the slightest breach.1 0
The court went on to hold, nevertheless that the First Amend-
ment did not prohibit New Jersey from spending tax raised funds
to pay the bus fares of pupils attending parochial and other schools;
it was, rather, to be regarded as aid to children as recipients of
benefits of public welfare legislation.
Attention should be called to the vigorous dissent of four of the
justices in the New Jersey case." They were quite unwilling to
accept the conclusion that the payment of the cost of transportation
of pupils to Catholic parochial schools was nothing more than the
carrying out of a legitimate social welfare problem on the part of
New Jersey They regarded the reasoning of the majority opinion
as inconsistent; it established an "impregnable wall of separation"
between state and church and then preceeded to breach it. As one
dissenting justice put it, the only precedent for such a decision was
the case of Byron's Julia who, whispering I'll never consent,
consented. If the state could pay the cost of transportation of pupils
to parochial schools, it could, by the same logic, pay the cost of
other parts of the sectarian educational program. Some critics insist
that while the wall of separation may still be there the Court has
not made it clear what lies on either side; others insist that the
wall has been reduced to the dimension of a picket fence.
10. Id. at 15-6.
11. Everson v. Board of Education, supra note 9.
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In subsequent cases the Court has passed upon the constitution-
ality of religious instruction and exercises in the public schools.
In 1948, the Court held unconstitutional a plan in force in the schools
of Champaign, Illinois, whereby teachers employed by various sec-
tarian groups but at no expense to the public schools were permitted
to come into the schools to give sectarian instruction to pupils whose
parents requested it. The Court held that the program m force
constituted the use of tax-supported property for religious instruction.
More than that, it was a close cooperation between public author-
ities and religious groups in promoting religious education; it found
the practice squarely under the ban of the First Amendment.1
2
Somewhat later in a New York case, it was held that the practice
of releasing public school pupils during a small part of the school
week to attend religious instruction in the community did not con-
stitute aid to religion; it was rather an accomodation to religion.
The Court went on to say- "When the state encourages religious
instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the
schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best in
our tradition. For it respects the religious nature of our people
and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs" 13
The New York Board of Regents formulated the following prayer
and recommended that it be used in the opening exercises of the
public schools. "Almighty God we acknowledge our dependence upon
Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers,
and our country " The state authorities made the prayer optional
with local school boards and with the parents of children. Five
parents of children attendihg a school in which the prayer was m
use challenged the use of the prayer on the ground that it violated
the establishment clause of the First Amendment. The Court sus-
tained their contention saying that "each separate government in
this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning
official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people
themselves and to those people choose to look to for religious guid-
ance."' 14 The following year the Court consolidated two cases, one
coming to it from Pennsylvania and the other from Maryland. The
Pennsylvania case involved a statute which required that at least
ten verses of scripture be read, without comment, at the opening of
each school day The Maryland case involved an ordinance of the
City of Baltimore which required that a chapter of the Bible be read
or the Lord's Prayer be recited each day The Court ruled that both
practices-the reading of the Bible and the reciting of the Lord's
Prayer-were violative of the establishment clause. 15
12. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
13. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
14. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962).
15. School District of Ablngton Township V. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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Within recent years Congress has enacted legislation which
makes possible the expenditure of federal funds to support education
at all levels and especailly at the college or university level. So
far the constitutionality of this legislation has not been tested in the
Supreme Court. It would appear that the reasoning back of this
legislation is that where the main purpose of federal aid is to ac-
complish some socially desirable secular purpose incidental benefits
accruing to religious institutions do not fall under the strictures of
the First Amendment.
Equal Protection of the Laws
Another limitation on the powers of the states with respect to
education is that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which pro-
vides that no state may deny any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. The interpretation given to this clause
has governed the cases dealing with racial segregation in the public
schools.
In 1896, the Supreme Court ruled in a case involving public
transportation facilities that segregation of the races was legal
provided equal facilities were provided each race.18 This was the
first appearance of the "separate but equal" doctrine. For the
next fifty years or so it was widely applied to the segregation of
the races in the public schools. Finally, in 1954 the doctrine was
squarely challenged as being in violation of the equal-protection-of-
the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court
consolidated cases that had come to it from a number of states and
in the first Brown decision 1 struck down the "separate but equal"
doctrine. In the words of the Court:
To separate them [Negro children] from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone. We conclude that in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."8
The next year in the second Brown decision 9 the Court remanded
the cases to the federal district courts in which they originated and
directed the procedures to be followed in implementing its first
decision. It placed upon local school boards the primary responsi-
bility of devising and implementing plans to end segregation; the
courts, guided by equitable principles, were to consider whether the
16. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
17. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347, U.S. 483 (1954).
18. Id. at 494-95.
19. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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action of school authorities constituted implementation of the gov-
erning constitutional principles. The Supreme Court realized that it
would be undesirable to try to enforce complete integration immedi-
ately but it did direct that the school authorities make a "prompt
and reasonable ' 20 start and then proceed with "all deliberate
speed." 21 During the period of transition to a racially nondiscrimi-
natory school system the district courts were to retain jurisdiction.
Since 1954 the federal courts have decided a number of cases
involving segregation in the public schools. These cases have dealt
with plans for ending segregation and with plans apparently designed
to delay action or to circumvent the requirements of the law At
first the courts were disposed to accept plans that exhibited good
faith and to permit adequate time for implementation. As time has
passed, however, the courts indicate that they are out of patience
with delay and that the time has passed for "deliberate speed."
Now local school authorities must end segregation without delay or
face the loss of any federal funds that otherwise they might receive.
The courts are divided upon the constitutionality of de facto
segregation growing out of housing patterns and with no intent to
perpetuate segregation. A number of courts, both state and lower
federal courts, have taken the position that the Brown decisions do
not mean that local boards of education must take steps to reduce
racial imbalance and to eliminate de facto segregation. 22 The weight
of authority is to the effect that the Brown decisions prohibit segre-
gation, but that they do not require integration.2 8 Negro children,
it is said, "have no constitutional right to have white children attend
school with them."'"
A federal district court, in holding that de facto segregation was
not illegal, followed the reasoning of most courts that take a similar
position. It said:
In this cause of action the plaintiffs are requesting the Court
to do what the Constitution forbids, that is, to recognize their
color. . Plaintiffs have a constitutional right not to be
objects of racial discrimination but they do not have a
constitutional right to attend or to refrain from attending a
particular school on the basis of racial considerations when
20. Id. at 300.
21. Id. at 301.
22. Downs v. Board of Education of Kansas City, 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964)
Lynch v. Kenston School District Board of Education, 229 F.Supp. 740 (E.D. Ohio 1964)
Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of City of Jackson. Tennessee, 221 F.Supp. 968 (E.D.
Tenn. 1963) Bell v. School City of Gary, Indiana, 213 F.Supp. 819, (N.D. Ind. 1963)
Jeffers v. Whitley, 197 F.Supp. 84 (M.D. N.C. 1961), Aaron v. Tucker, 186 F.Supp. 913
(E.D. Ark. 1960).
23. See, e.g., McNeese v. Board of Education, etc., 305 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1962) Bush
V. Orleans Parish School Board, 190 F.Supp. 861 (E.D. La. 1960), Balaban v. Rubin, 248
N.Y.S. 2d 574 (1964).
24. Downs v. Board of Education of Kansas City, aupra note 22, at 998 See also Evers
V. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 232 F.Supp. 241 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
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there has been no actual discrimination against them. The
law is color blind and, in such cases as this, that principle,
which was designed to insure equal protection to all citizens,
is both a shield and a sword. While protecting them in their
right to be free from racial discrimination, it at the same
time denies them the right to consideration on a racial basis
where there has been no discrimination.
2 5
Again it was said by a New York court:
the desegregation required by the Constitution, as inter-
preted by the Brown cases, does not mean that there must
be an intermingling of the races in all school districts. It does
not mean that, regardless of school zones or the residence
of Negro or white students, there is an absolute, affirmative
duty on the part of every board of education to integrate the
races so as to bring about, as nearly as possible, racial
balance in each of the schools under its supervision. It does
not mean, for example, that white children in non-contiguous
or outlying areas must be 'bussed' into a Negro area in
order to desegregate a Negro school.
26
Other courts, however, take an opposite position, holding that
school boards must act to reduce racial imbalance and to eliminate
de facto segregation.2 7 It has been held that a school board may,
without violating the constitutional rights of white children, take
race into consideration when it changes boundary lines in order to
achieve racial balance38  In a few instances, however, it has been
held that a board may not take race into consideration, when it
changes boundary lines of attendance areas, in order to achieve
racial balance.2 9 As one court put it, "the law is color blind".30
Both state and lower federal courts are in wide disagreement
on many issues involved in de facto segregation and it will take
one or more Supreme Court decisions to resolve these differences.
Due Process of Law
Another limitation on the powers of the states in the field of
education is that clause in the Fourteenth Amendment which pro-
vides that no state may deprive any person within its jurisdiction
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law The Supreme
Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty guaran-
25. Lynch v. Kenston School District Board of Education, supra note 22, at 744.
26. Balaban v. Rubin, supra note 23, at 581.
27. Barksdale v. Springfield School Committee, 237 F.Supp. 543 (E.D. Mass. 1965),
Blocker v. Board of Education of Manhasset, New York, 229 F.Supp. 709 (E.D. N.Y.
1964) Taylor v. Board of Education of City School District, 191 F.Supp. 181 (S.D. N.Y.
1961).
28. Fuller v. yolk, 230 F.Supp. 25 (D.N.J. 1964), Morean v. Board of Education of
Montclair, 42 N.J. 237, 200 A.2d 97 (1964).
29. DiSano v. Storandt, 250 N.Y.S. 2d 701 (1964).
30. Lynch v. Kenston School District Board of Education, eupra note 22, at 18.
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teed by due process. Each case is considered in terms of the particu-
lar web of facts in which it is embedded. If after a consideration of
all the pertinent facts the Court finds that the action of the
state complained of was taken for a purpose and exercised in a
manner reasonably necessary to protect and insure the public safety
and welfare it will hold that due process has not been violated.
If, on the other hand, the Court regards the action as unnecessary
and an unreasonable restriction upon personal liberty or as an
arbitrary interference with property rights, it will rule that due
process has been violated.
A few cases will serve to illustrate how the due-process clause
may limit the power of the states to formulate and execute their
educational policies. In Nebraska, during World War I, the selective
draft law revealed that thousands of men born of foreign-language-
speaking parents and educated in schools taught in a foreign lan-
guate were unable to read, write, or speak the language of their
country, or understand words of command given in English. It was
revealed, too, that there were local foci of alien enemy sentiment
and that this sentiment had been strongest in those communities
where instruction in private and parochial schools had been given
in a foreign language. Feeling that the state's social integrity was
threatened, the legislature passed a statute making it unlawful to
teach a foreign language to pupils in private, parochial, or public
schools who had not completed the eighth grade. When the case
came before the Supreme Court it ruled that the statute was an
arbitrary intereference with the liberty of parents to control the
education of their children and with the liberty of modern language
teachers to pursue a lawful calling.31 In Oregon a statute required
children between the ages of eight and sixteen to attend a public
school. Again the court ruled that the statute violated the due-process
clause in that it unreasonably interferred with the liberty of parents
in the upbringing and education of their children. Said the court:
"The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
' 82
THE STATE AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The distribution of power with respect to education in our federal
system places on each of the states the primary responsibility for
formulating its educational policies and for the support and admin-
istration of its schools. The Congress must find express or implied
authority for all of its legislation in some clause or combination
In the Constitution; with the states the case is different. They do
31. Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1928).
32. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 585 (1925).
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not look to the federal constitution for any grant of powers; their
governmental powers are plenary unless the power in question has
been delegated to the central government, or unless it has been
denied to the states by some provision in the federal constitution.
It follows that a state legislature, except where restricted by consti-
tutional limitations, may define the ends to be attained and the
means to be employed in the development of an educational system.
The legislature may determine the types of schools to be established
throughout the state, the means of their support, the organs of their
administration, the content of their curricula, and the qualifications
of their teachers. All these matters may be determined with or
without the consent of the localities, for in education the state is
the unit and there are no local rights except such as are safe-
guarded by the constitution.
Historically the distribution of power with respect to education
in our federal system has worked well. It has prevented rigid central
control; it has permitted local communities to develop policies and
practices suited to their local needs; and it has made possible much
experimentation. In recent years, however, there are those who
feel that federal influence over education has become far too great.
